brookings institute funded by china

Lindsey W. Ford, Tarun Chhabra, and Ryan Hass, A conversation on the US approach to the Peoples Republic of China with Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman, Global China: US-China relations through the lens of technology competition, Global China: US-China relations through the lens of great power competition, Global China: Assessing Chinas growing role in the world, Global China: Assessing Beijings growing influence in the international system, Global China: Examining Chinas approach to global governance and norms, Global China Webinar: Assessing Chinas growing regional influence and strategy, Webinar: Global China Assessing Chinas technological reach in the world, Global China: Assessing Chinas relations with the great powers, Global China: Assessing Chinas role in East Asia, Global China: Assessing Chinas growing role in the world and implications for U.S.-China strategic competition, Chinas choices and the fate of the post-post-Cold War era, Ukraine presents opportunity to test Chinas strategic outlook, Around the halls: Implications of Russias invasion of Ukraine, Pavel K. Baev, Jessica Brandt, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Jeremy Greenwood, Samantha Gross, Daniel S. Hamilton, Bruce Jones, Marvin Kalb, Patricia M. Kim, Suzanne Maloney, Amy J. Nelson, Thomas Pickering, Bruce Riedel, Natan Sachs, Constanze Stelzenmller, Caitlin Talmadge, Shibley Telhami, David G. Victor, and Andrew Yeo, Learning the right lessons from Ukraine for Taiwan, Ryan Hass, Patricia M. Kim, Emilie Kimball, Jessica Brandt, David Dollar, Cameron F. Kerry, Aaron Klein, Joshua P. Meltzer, Chris Meserole, Amy J. Nelson, Pavneet Singh, Melanie W. Sisson, and Thomas Wright, Global China: Assessing Chinas Growing Role in the World, Edited by Tarun Chhabra, Rush Doshi, Ryan Hass, and Emilie Kimball, Balancing act: Major powers and the global response to US-China great power competition, Fiona Hill, Tanvi Madan, Amanda Sloat, Mireya Sols, Constanze Stelzenmller, Bruce Jones, Emilie Kimball, Jesse I. Kornbluth, and Ted Reinert, Playing with fire: Italy, China, and Europe, Charts of the Week: Chinas rising economic and military spending, Rethinking US-China competition: Next generation perspectives, Tarun Chhabra, Rush Doshi, Ryan Hass, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Bruce Jones, and Will Moreland. Universities should, of course, continue to be vigilant against the potential for unwelcome influence including implicit pressure on faculty to self-censor, as well as to ensure compliance with the Department of Educations foreign gift and other reporting requirements, and visa rules for CI exchange visitors. For the United States, it is about protecting a crucial democratic friend, and perhaps also reducing the odds that China could gain a strategic asset. In contrast, a 2018 joint Hoover Institute-Asia Society study of Chinese influence activities in the U.S., which acknowledged concerns that campus-based CIs might potentially infringe on academic freedomand made similar recommendations to reduce potential risksfound no actual interference by CIs in mainstream Chinese studies curricula on U.S. campuses and that most CIs operate without controversy. In May 2018, the Pentagon recommended stores on U.S. military bases stop selling phones from Huawei as well as the Chinese tech giant ZTE because they may pose an unacceptable risk, according to a Pentagon spokesman. Although Japanese and South Korean firms also sit within the top ten holders of smart city patents, State Grid Corporations 7,156 patents in November 2020 was more than double second-ranked Samsungs mere 3,148 patents. Despite a bipartisan congressional finding announced in February 2019 of no evidence that these institutes are a center for Chinese espionage efforts or any other illegal activity, the 2021 NDAA broadens the restriction to funding for any program at universities that host CIs. Similarly, flouting of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and decisions by the big players is particularly hard on small and medium-sized economies. As tensions between the U.S. and China grew, federal policymakers frequently conflated CI-related academic freedom concerns with a broader set of issues including: Chinese efforts to steal technology, intellectual property and research data; disruptive activities by some campus-based Chinese student associations and Chinas consulates; Chinese talent recruitment plans; and other suspect influence efforts. (Huawei contributed between $100,000 and $249,000 to Brookings from July 2012 to June 2013.). Without understanding this, the United States will struggle to craft effective policies and get ahead in the U.S.-China tech competition. In the financial realm, the United States and China are the key players who create a low-inflation environment for the global economy. Nonetheless, school officials joined others interviewed in the GAO and Senate studies in suggesting CI management improvements, such as clarifying U.S. universities authority and making agreements publicly available. On April 11, Tanvi Madan joined Global Georgetown for the discussion, Assessing Chinas Influence in South Asia.. Huaweis website posted a story entitled Brookings Institution releases report ranking global cities on public safety innovation at Huawei Asia Pacific Innovation Day 2017, featuring a photo of West speaking. However, the Chinese International Education Foundation (CIEF), a nominally independent organization registered with the Civil Affairs Ministry, supervised by MOE, and initiated by 27 Chinese universities, companies and social organizations, will manage the CI brand and program. The proliferation of WeChat throughout Chinese societyspanning generations and across the urban-rural divideis a monumental feat and demonstrates WeChats adaptability. This, combined with its extensive set of development, infrastructure, technology and energy investments and loansnot just in the developing world, but in emerging markets in Latin America and the smaller economies of Europe is giving China a major platform for leverage and influence within globalization itself, and on global issues. There also is deep interdependence between the United States and China across a range of issues. With respect to a frequently voiced concern that CI agreements often stipulate applicability of both U.S. and Chinese law, it reproduced a common provision also contained in the Hanban template CI agreement that Chinese personnel working at CIs must comply with U.S. law, while Chinese law would apply to Americans involved in China-based CI activities. U.S.-China relationship is undergoing a transition toward intensifying rivalry even as it remains highly interdependent across a range of domains. How does current U.S. policy respond to Chinese influence and strategy in the region? But China is not just a growing military power; its also increasingly intent on wielding a combination of diplomatic and economic tools to challenge or reshape the terms and conditions of global order and global governance. The Indo-Pacific is evolving in one more fundamental way: the rewiring of the lines of security and economic cooperation. Other military contingencies involving China, for example those in the so-called gray zone, are worrisome too, ranging from the South China Sea to the East China Sea. Can the U.S. and China work together to make progress on new uses of technology to fight these challenges. Chinas leadership understands the challenges facing SOEs in being innovative and has built systems to address them. Formerly a professor at Brown University, West has written 19 books, according to his LinkedIn page, and is a respected commentator on issues involving technology policy, privacy and security. A few examples: Brookings . Disturbances in the financial system, especially the U.S. one, lead to crises in the developing world. This article was published more than4 years ago. On the other hand, Chinas relationship with Russia provides an opportunity for both of those countries to work together to counter and undermine the long-standing U.S.-led international order. What can the U.S. and its democratic partners do to ensure that the next generation of AI technologies have democratic values such as privacy, transparency, and verifiability baked in by design? Where if at all does the United States derive benefit from its interdependence with China, and where is it vulnerable from its interdependence with China? Broadly, can the U.S. and China find a way to cooperate on energy and climate issues amidst their strained relationship? The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command believes it plausible that China could attempt a forced reunification with Taiwan by the latter years of the 2020s; whatever Beijings actual plans, Taiwan politics interject an additional element into the strategic equation, beyond the ability of either Washington or Beijing to control. Distortive trade practices from either one subsidies that distort trade, dumping, or protectionism via tariffs or non-tariff barriers reduce development opportunities. The author thanks James Haynes, former Research Assistant, and intern Jingye Huang - Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, The Brookings Institution, and Mia Shuang Li and research assistant Claire Ren Yixin of the Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center, for valuable research assistance and insights. As the analyst Arthur Kroeber argues in Chinas Economy, Chinese firms are good at adaptive innovationthe concept of taking existing products, services, or processes and modifying them to make them more receptive to Chinas economic and military needs. So when Chinas Peoples Liberation Army unveiled its J-20 stealth fighter in 2011, it caused an uproar in U.S. defense circles because of its similarity to American equivalents and seemed to confirm the perception of China as reliant on copying the work of others. The CI program sent hundreds of teachers to help meet U.S. government goals for Mandarin instruction under the Bush and Obama administrations. Powering a Clean Energy Future. From 2018-2020, the Brookings Global China project produced one of the largest open source diagnostic assessments of Chinas actions in every major geographic and functional domain. If U.S. policymakers operate under the supposition that China will merely continue to copy American technologies, strategies, and processes, they will fundamentally misunderstand Chinas strategic intentions. To some extent, they werent entirely wrong. Australias caution on Taiwan may not last, To Rule the Waves: How Control of the Worlds Oceans Shapes the Fate of the Superpowers, Project on International Order and Strategy. In 2014, West spoke at Huawei Innovation Day in Milan. Taken together, the growing success of Chinese universities and companies discredits the idea that only democracies are amenable to innovation. These include: What approach can the U.S. pursue across strategic domains to integrate economic, military, and diplomatic measures to avoid conflict with China? How important is Europe for Americas China policy? Brookings will not accept gifts from donors who seek to undermine the independence of its scholars research or otherwise to predetermine or influence recommendations.). What are the trend lines when it comes to Chinas relationship with regional countries, and what are the major challenges, roadblocks, or gaps in these relationships? Second, the group will focus on Americas policy choices in response to Chinas economic investments and security relationships in these regions: what is current U.S. policy, what is America doing right, and where can it improve? China aspires to global technology leadership. In the strategic competition with China, U.S. alliances and partnerships in Europe and the Indo-Pacific play an important role in enhancing American power. At the same time, Beijing also . Yet, interest among U.S. students has been declining since peaking around 2011, as American views of China more generally have plunged to the lowest level since polling began. In October 2017, the Brookings Institution, one of Washingtons most prestigious think tanks, published a report entitled Benefits and Best Practices of Safe City Innovation. The report included a case study praising the Kenyan capital Nairobi and the Chinese city of Lijiang for implementing new technology in policing. According to Open Secrets, Brookings has donated 96% or $824,259 to Democratic candidates and causes since 1990. China has worked to restructure its higher education system to develop universities capable of conducting research and competing at an international level through the 985 Project, the 211 Project, and now the Double First-Class Plan. As a result of the COVID pandemic and recession, debt burdens that had seemed prudent in many cases are now unsustainable. Chinas smart cities market is estimated to be worth more than $1 trillion, and three Chinese entities dominate smart city patents. Aside from financial instability arising in the two big economies, there are various external shocks that buffet countries or regions. The American hub-and-spoke alliance system is increasingly operating in tandem with networked security arrangements such as the Quad, AUKUS, and a host of issue-specific bilaterals and trilaterals. Here, China has shifted from being a rule-taker to a rule-shaper. What began as a messaging app no different than WhatsApp or Skype has evolved into a high-tech Swiss Army knife of sorts. To what extent do China, the United States, or the region see the regions relationships with China and the U.S. as zero-sum both in terms of economic and security relationships? China has already made a major bid for influence in the instruments of international economic governance. The push toward a state capitalist systemone in which ostensibly private Chinese firms compete alongside traditional SOEshas put new and innovative Chinese companies on the global stage. Since President Xi Jinping in 2013 launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to facilitate exchanges between China and the broader Eurasian region through new land and maritime links, it has become the country's signature foreign policy venture. In other words, what must the United States achieve and avoid with China? The Indo-Pacific Quad, which includes the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is increasingly an important forum for American policy in the region. Our group will focus on strengthening U.S. responses to the Taiwan security challenge in particular. Individuals are able to do almost anything using the app, from ordering food and paying bills to filing for divorce and applying for visas. Funding from the 863 Program supported the development of Chinas Tianhe-1A supercomputer, which overtook Oak Ridge National Laboratorys Jaguar as the worlds fastest computer in October 2010. What are other worthy goals that merit policy focus, but that fall below must have priorities with respect to China? Beijings re-innovation strategy is key element of U.S.-China competition, effectively curbing its only potential rival. U.S. experts and policymakers cannot operate under the flawed and debunked assumption that China cannot innovate in these emerging technologies. What are the interests and national security strategies of key regional players which include but go beyond the usual like-minded group: Japan, South Korea, India, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Philippines? It should disaggregate legitimate national security concerns, including Chinese espionage and technology theft, from academic freedom issues that are best left to our universities. How can Washington ensure that democracies take the lead in privacy-preserving machine learning, explainable machine learning, and AI safety? GGFs play a variety of roles: Some are designed to promote a strategic high-tech industry like semiconductors or AI; others aim to attract industry to a specific city or region within China. How do President Xi Jinpings personal ambitions and the centralization of power in the Chinese Communist Party affect Chinas approach to foreign policy? What does a global China mean for the US and the world? Regardless of the skepticism that it could do so, China has demonstrated its capacity to innovate and compete technologically on a global scale. Other planning documents of the Xi-era, such as the 2015 Innovation-Driven Development Strategy (IDDS), describe the capability to innovate technologically as a source of national strength and links this concept to the dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Chinas MOE reorganized the CI project in June 2020, implementing a CCP-approved reform plan to develop CIs as a significant force for cultural and educational exchange with other countries. Despite promising to produce thin and modern 7-nanometer chips, SMIC lacks the machine tools to make them. The Brookings Doha Center, an arm of the think tank in Qatar's capital that focuses on Middle East issues, is funded largely by the Qatari government, which has pledged $21.6 million to . It further reported a variety of negotiated provisions making U.S. law, as well as school policies, applicable to all CI activities, as in this published agreement. Yi Gang, then deputy governor of the People's Bank of China, speaks at a 2016 event held by the Brookings Institution in Washington about China and the world economy. Chinas recent advancements in AI and related technology have raised concerns in Washington and elsewhere. But so has a decline of American student interest in China studies and learning Mandarin Chinese. It will also explore whether the great powers can cooperate on common global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and nuclear non-proliferation. This working group will first seek to define Chinas role in these three regions and highlight the factors that determine its influence. An influential 2017 study of 12 CIs by the National Association of Scholars identified a range of concerns including transparency, contractual language, academic freedom and pressure to self-censor. About the Tax Policy Center. Beijings move to establish a comprehensive technology transfer system is founded on the assumption that these strategic technologies will make their way to China in order to be re-innovated, not just copied. How state and local leaders can harness new infrastructure funding to build a stronger, more . Ryan Hass, Emilie Kimball, and Bill Finan, Global China is contesting the US-led order, Rush Doshi, Lindsey W. Ford, and Ryan Hass, The global competition to govern digital trade, Global Chinas energy and climate policies, Jeffrey Ball, Lindsey W. Ford, and Samantha Gross, Lindsey W. Ford, Bruce Riedel, and Natan Sachs, Global Chinas ambitions in the Indian Ocean region, Lindsey W. Ford, Zach Vertin, and Joshua T. White, Technology competition between the US and a Global China, Lindsey W. Ford, Chris Meserole, and Tom Stefanick, 5G Deployment and Digital Competition with China, Margaret Taylor, Tom Wheeler, and Nicol Turner Lee, Global Chinas advanced technology ambitions, Lindsey W. Ford, Saif M. Khan, and Remco Zwetsloot, Global Chinas ambitions across East Asia, Lindsey W. Ford, Richard C. Bush, Jonathan Stromseth, and Lynn Kuok, Global Chinas plan for overseas military bases, Lindsey W. Ford, Mara Karlin, and Leah Dreyfuss, Deterring military conflict with a global China, Lindsey W. Ford, Michael E. OHanlon, and Caitlin Talmadge, Chinese domestic politics in the rise of global China. Although news accounts describe Ren as reclusive, West writes, he found Ren charming, articulate, and funny. (Huawei didnt respond to multiple requests for comment.). It remains too soon to determine whether these interdependencies will mitigate or intensify rivalry. Yet the U.S. is facing a critical shortage of Mandarin-speaking China experts. Rather than copying capitalist systems like that of the United States, the Chinese government has sought to create a system that, through various formal and informal channels, promotes connectivity between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and nominally private Chinese enterprises. Deterring a cross-Strait conflict: Beijings assessment of evolving US strategy. But the Indo-Pacific is also bedeviled by security challenges: rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, North Koreas intensified nuclear and missile programs, and the military coup in Myanmar. And like Britain and the United States before it, it increasingly views its challenge to the primacy of the status quo power and its growing influence in global order and governance, as two sides of the same strategy. For most developing countries, either China or the United States is the largest trading partner and access to these enormous markets is a key foundation for prosperity. As the United States charts its path to retain its essential role as a preeminent Pacific power, it must first get its priorities right. To drive the development of new policy thinking for Americas approach to China, this working group will examine several central questions as well as other issues that are derivative of them. Lis Smith Campaign Manager, Articles B